Certainty as Regards the Existence of Physical Objects in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein by Mishlove, Robert
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1972
Certainty as Regards the Existence of Physical
Objects in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig
Wittgenstein
Robert Mishlove
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1972 Robert Mishlove
Recommended Citation
Mishlove, Robert, "Certainty as Regards the Existence of Physical Objects in the Later Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein" (1972).
Master's Theses. Paper 2586.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/2586
CERTAil~TY AS REGARDS 'l'HE EXIST&NC~ OF PHYJICAL 
Ol3JECT3 IN THE LATER PHILOSOPHY OF LUDWIG WITTGE~1STBIN 
by 
dobert .Mishlove 
A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of 
Loyola University of Chicago in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Master of Arts. 
January 
1972 
PREFACE 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's .Qn Certaigt:y;, recently edited by 
G. H. Von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, presents philoso-
phical difficulties which occupied its author in the last 
year and a half of his life. The theme which has been 
abstracted for explication and interpretation in this essay 
is his analysis of certainty as regards the existence of 
physical objects, i.e. the external world. 
Wittgenstein's analysis will consist in the description 
of such concepts as: 0 to know", "to believe", "to be cer-
tain", "proposition", "to doubt", "to justify", "to mistaken 
and physical object". Thus Wittgenstein's analysis will 
take the form of a semantic analysis of a classical epi-
temological problem. 
The first chapter will offer Wittgenstein's positive 
characterization of the cluster of epistemic concepts men-
tioned above. What will be delineated are his re.flections 
on prominent aspects of the structure of factual discourse. 
The second chapter is a further clarif ieat.ion of his analy-
sis of the epis~emic concepts described in the first chap-
ter. aut here his analysis of the limits of factual dis-
course will be given through his criticism of G. E. Moore 
and the sceptical doubts as to the existence of the external 
world. The final chapter will take up the question of the 
status of propositions about the existence of the external 
world in light of the above. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
WITTGE!13TEIN'.:3 ANALYSIS OF A CLUST"~R OF PROMINENT 
EPIST&~IC CONCEPTS 
The philosopher's task, for Wittgenstein, is to undei-
stand the structure and limits of thought. The method he 
used was to study the structure and limits of language. 
His philosophy is a critical one. He believed that phi-
losophers often unwittingly go beyond the bounds of language 
into a kind of nonsense that se$111S to express genuine thought 
but in fact does not do so. Wittgenstein wanted to discover 
the location of the line dividing sense from nonsense so that 
philosophers might realize when they reach it and stop. This 
negative side of the philosopher•s task reveals a positive 
side. His purpose is not merely to formulate instructions 
which would save philosophers from trying to say what cannot 
be said in language, but also to succeed in understanding 
the structure of what can be said.1 
This chapter offers a characterization of Wittgenstein's 
conception of the positive side of the philosopher's task. 
In the first section, his analysis of "grammar" and "criteria" 
is given. The second section centers on his clarification 
of certain prominent epist.emic concepts used 1n factual dis-
course, Wittgenstein's criticisms of G. E. Moore's rejection 
of the sceptic's argum~ts against certainty in regard to 
1navid Pears, Lijdwig ~ittgenst!in, {New York: The Viking 
Press, 1969), P• 2. 
l 
t,he existence of physical objects is left to Chapter Two, 
This division serves a triple purpose in the explication 
o£ Wittgenstein's analysis of the status o£ propositions 
about the existence or the &Xt.ernal world. 
First, Wittgenstein himself makes no clear textual 
indications as to where his criticism or others ends and 
where his own positive characterisations began. As an 
aid 1n understanding his reflections such a division is 
necessary. Second, resultant upon the absence or any 
such clear indicat1onal dwices, some interpretors have 
taken Wit'tgenstein as a kind ot "meta-philosopher" who 
is content to refute theses without replacing them with 
less objectionable ones. This interpretation needs to 
be corrected. To be sure, in his later work he does 
not ofter any explicit theory or language, but he does 
otter nwnerous descriptions or ordinary discourse through 
which the grammar of language is revealed. In t..11is sense, 
he does otter a partial. analysis of the structure or lan-
guage. It is inlport;ant to realize this point. Third, 
and most import.ant, it 1s only by understanding his de-
scription of the structure or tactual discourse that it; 
is possible to fully comprehend his crit.icism ot :::;oepti-
, 
eia and Moore's objection to the sceptic's arguments. 
It is only by understanding the st-ructure of tactual dis-
course that one can recognize the transcending o£ its 
limits in the produ.otion of a subtle variety o£ nonsense. 
2 
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SECTION I 
We will now present the grammar of a cluster of inter-
related concepts which are used in factual discourse. For 
Wittgenstein, the grammar of these concepts is something 
like the rules by which they are used; the game in which 
they are played; the logic of their functioning. 'l'hese 
metaphors should be clarified before our analysis proceeds. 
In Qn CertainE£, everything that is descriptive of 
language-game is part of logic.(C-56) 2 Wittgenstein writes: 
••• What sort of proposition is: "What could a 
mistake here be like!" It would have to be a 
logical proposition. But it is not a logic 
which is used, because what it tells us is 
not learned through propositions - it is a 
logical proposition; for it does describe the 
conceptual. {linguistic) situation.(C-51) 
or again: 
••• If "I know, etc." is conceived as a gram-
matical proposition, of course the "I" cannot 
be important. And it properly means "there 
is no such thing as doubt in this case" or 
"the expression 'I do not know' makes no 
sense in this case". And of course it follows 
from this that 'I know• makes no sense either.(C-58) 
Logical explanations, in this sense, will be descriptions 
of the game, i.e. rules of the game, called language. Exten-
ding the game analogy, one can say that logical or grammatical 
descriptions are a collection of the rules by which we play 
the game. 
2Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, Trans. by Denis Paul 
&: G.E.M. Anscombe and editea by o.s.M. Anscombe &: G.H. Von 
Wright, (New York: J. & J. Harper Edition, 1969). Note: All 
further references to On Certainty appear in the paper proper 
..!3f"f'6,...~.f,,.,....,. .... I"\ """"..,,...,,..~_.,....,..~"" ....... \... ._.. ..... ....._1 __ .__J__ ..... _ ~-- 1 •. , .. • -'-
Here Wittgenstein finds a correspondence between 
"rules" and ''meaning". {C-62) "A meaning of a word is the 
kind of ellployment of it. For it is what we learn when 
the word is incorpora:ted into our language•. { c-61} Here 
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is strong textual support for t'Jle relatedness of "grammar", 
"meaning", 0 rule", "logic", and "language-game". 
Furthermore the relatedness of these concepts can be 
shown in that the concept "grammar", supported by these 
related conc~pts, is of prime importance in Wittgenstein's 
attitude towards the claim of formal logic to be sole ax-
biter of s1gni£icance in discourse. The thesis that logie 
nw.st operate according to strict rules, with no vagueness 
or imprecision, is attacked in .Qn. QertaY'Jtz (sections 26-
6;). In place of the mathematical exactitude of formal 
logic Wit,tgens i..ein emphasises ••grammar", which rests upon 
agreement in the way people aet, upon a form of life. 
These remarks will be presupposed in the following dis-
cussion. Thus about a proposition of which its opposite 
is self-contradict.ory wittgenstein does not, in .P .. i: ~J!£1Caint,z, 
say that they are ,.analytic" or *'tautological", these terms 
being reminiscent or his earlier Traetatus and formal logic -
but that they are "grammatical". 
In this essay we shall utilize a logical tool which is 
not mentioned in .Qn Cer!eaintx. 'L'his is t..lie concept "cri-
terion", This concept, first fo.rmulated in the .!UY.I and 
Brown 3ooy, is used extensively in the PhUogoP!!ig~ 
Invyti.gati2ns. 
Within these works "grammar" and "criterion° are 
ref erred to in order to decide about the propriety ot an 
utterance,. 'l'he expression "crit;erion" is connected to 
t.he question of the propriety o£ same of these utterences 
or about the circumstances in which some utterence is 
appropriate. In the Mt.Iestiga~ion§, when he discusses 
the grammar of' "to fit", "to be able .. , and "to undei-
standf', he \'fTites: 
••• The criteria which we accept for ••fitting11 , 
••being able to", '*understanding'", are much more 
complicated than might appear at first. That 
is, the game_with these words, their employment 
in the lingU.1stic intercoarae that is oarried 
on by their means• is more involved - the role 
of these words in our language other than we 
are tempted to think.) 
As we will show, the grammar of "to believe", "to 
know", are essentially related to the criteria for the 
normal utterance of "I believe that ••• " and "I know 
that ..... So though Wittgenstein does not use the expres-
sion "criterion" there is overwhelming textual evidence 
to show that it in no way distorts the explication of his 
analysis. Indeed, it will be shown that Wittgenstein's 
understanding of t.he concept "proposition" is partially an 
extension and developm~t of the concepts "criterion" and 
5 
31.udwig Wittgenstein, Philgyoehig~ ~figati2!}s, 
Trans. by G.Z.r>l. Anscombet '(f~eworlhe~!an Company, 
195$), section 182. 
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.aetore o£ter1ng the distinctive .featuru of .. criterion"• 
a brief' description should be given. Wittgenstein opposes 
the concept •criterion" to the concept .. a?.11.ptoul•. To the 
question "How do you know that so-and-so is the case?"• 
Wittgenstein writes that we sometimes answer by giving 
"criteria" and sometimes by giving "symptoms". In the lUl!! 
Jm.4 1£2.YB bJss he uses as an example an in.f'lamation caused 
by a part.ieular bacillus called angina. To the question 
"Why do you say this nr.an has got angina?• The answer "lie 
has the bacillus so-and-so 1n his blood" gives the criterion 
tor angina. It "11• answer was •His throat was inflauaed.•, 
this mj.ght be a symptQ.Ul of angina. 
Wittgenstein regard.a "s71Dpt011" as a phenomenon which 
past experience has shown that 1t coinoided, in some way 
or other, with the phenomenon which is the criterion. To 
say "A man has angina if this bacillus is .found in him" is 
a loose way of giving the naeaning of the concept angina. 
But to say, "A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed 
throat" is to make a hypothesis. 4 
4Ludw1g Wittgenstein• ~~d ~ Boak@; (New Yorks 
Harper & Brothers, l9S8), PP• 4"== • 
Now we tux-n to \he discription ot the dist.inotive 
feat,urea of •criterion". We will draw upon the work done 
7 
by N. Garver in his calrification of the concept "ori'terion" • .5 
But we shall use texu cited .trom.Qn Cl.CtaYJt1, in support 
of Garver's und~s'tanding of this concept as wa.e developed 
by Wittgenstein in the Phiiosophigf:Y, .Iny!§tigation§ and 
t,he .m,.u .!!14 Brow ll2W • 
If one asks someone what kind of thing a criteria is, 
tor the other to say that it 1s an instrument of a certain 
sort would be a good introduc1;0ry answer. Wi'ttgenstein 
follows the basic dictionary definition or a criterion as 
a test or standard or canon of oorrect,ness. 
One can now ask, What these instruments are for? In 
Jal Ce£li!!nty, Wit'tgens'tein offers criteria for a variety 
of ditf erent 'things& for a person knowing something, for 
being in a st.ate of conviction, for a person believing 
something, for calling a particular tree a cedar t,ree, e'tc. 
Wittgenstein's criteria have their application in connection 
wi1ih linguistic expressions. When he describes th• criteria 
;Newton Garver, "Wittgenstein On Criteria," in ~owl11dg! 
;!d ~~imce, edited tr.t D.D. Rollins, (Pittsburgh: nivei-styo !ttsliurgh Press, 1964}, pp • .55-71. For a comprehen-
sive bibliography of work done on the notion of "criteria" 
see w.G. Lycan, .. !fonindu.ctive Evidences Recent work on 
Wi&tgenatein's 'Criteria'!" in }unerig!Q Phi~os2phic!Jr guerttrlr, 
Vol. a, No. 2, 1971, PP• 22-5. 
r 
for a person's believing something, it must be recalled 
that it is short hand for th• criteria for the use of 
such expressions as "I beli.ve that...... That is, cri-
teria do not determine the empirical tact that A believes, 
but We "meaning" o!' "A believes*, and this .foras part 
of the grammar 0£ "to believa•.(c-61) 
The utterances tor which there are criteria are 
those stat•en:ts whioh the speaker has same war ot knowing 
to be true or t"alse or which he might justify by reterence 
to something other than what is stated in his utte.ranoes.(0-14) 
All utterances ot tl11s sort have criteria governing their 
use. Once it is agreed that criteria govern 'the use ot 
certain lingu.istie exprassions, it is reasonable to ex-
pect that they govern t.he use of all those utterances that 
make statements which the speaker can know, justity or 
verify.(C-l.05) 
In that eritex-ia. are human instruznentta, criteria are 
always the criteria of some person or group of persons. 
This is an important point t,o emphasise in that one will 
not con.fuse criteria with necessary and sufficient oondi-
tions. It is absuro to suppose that for one person title 
necessary and $u!'f1aient,condit1ons for a cedar tree grow-
ing would be different than for ano'tiher person. The neces-
sary and sut.ficient conditions are something in 'the world, 
they are not a matter of linguistic convention. With 
criteria the case is different, there may be a dive:r-
gency among people, social groups or cultures. 
Criteria are arbitrary, in the sense that there 
need be no justification for criteria being what t.~ey 
are. The whole point of criteria is that they dete:r-
mine what we say.(C-105) To use the rule analogy for 
a moment, a rule indicates what we are to say. One 
needs no reason for following such a rule as we do; 
rather one is trained to follow it when we learn the 
language.(C-2u5} 
Criteria are internalized in linguistic practice, 
and the people who use them may be quite unable to say 
what they are. Using Ryle's distinction between "knowing 
how" and "knowing that .. , one can say that after children 
have been trained in the use of linguistic expression$, 
they are still unable to explicate the grammar of their 
language 1n Wittgenstein's sense.(C-95} 
These criteria are generally rough and imprecise; 
it is their regular use and acknowledgment, rather than 
precision which makes tJlem useful. To say they are im-
precise is only in light, of a purity which had been de-
manded by the Wittgenstein of the Traqtat'S§• They are 
as precise as they need be for human communication. 
9 
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The roughness of criteria can be delineated in two 
ways. First, the crit.eria for .,I know that ••• 0 determine 
the sorts of things that would show "I know that ••• " is 
true or false; and to say whether some set of circumstances 
are of this sort or not requires discrimination t,hat is 
not determined by the criteria and is only given in prac-
tice. (C-29) l'he second way in which the roughness of 
criteria shows itself is in one's inability to say exactly 
what the criteria are even for simple utterances. Wittgen-
stein writes1 "Am I not getting closer and closer to 
saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You 
must look at the practice of language, then you will see 
it."(C-501) 
Criteria presuppose circumstances of application. 
This characteristic is apparent in cases where there are 
many different criteria for a linguistic expression. The 
vast majority of concepts have several complementary 
criteria. 
Furthermore there may be a fluctuation between the 
criteria tor a linguistic expression and symptoms or evi-
dence for it. "The same proposition may get treated at 
one time as something to be tested by experience at another 
' 
as a rule of testing".(C-109) But it would be incorrect 
to say that there were only symptoms or evidence. 
r 
ll 
Wittgenstein's understanding ot the concepts "grammar" 
and "criteria• have now been explicated. \•ie are now in 
a position to offer a detailed account or his analysis of 
certain prominent epistemic concepts. His analysis will 
present a partial description of the grammar, i.e. use of 
these concepts through a presentation of theRcriteria. 
SECTI01~ II 
We will start our examination of Wittgenstein's 
analysis with the concept .. to know", then go on to "to 
believe", "to doubt", ttto be certain", and *'proposition". 
This is not to say that we will not have cause to note 
his analysis of othor concepts in the clarification of' 
the above. 
The explication will be somewhat reoonstructive. 
because many of the linguistic situations are of the 
author's i.."1vention. Those situations have been developed 
out of t.>iose given by Wittgenstein in his s001ewhat abbre-
viated style. They have no distorting etreot on the 
doctrine presentecil the doctrines are Wittgenstein's. 
Wittgenstein offers n\.l.merous oammonplaoe situations 
in which the conoept "to know" is used. He is concerned 
with revealing the linguistic presupposition ot these 
' 
situations. In presenting the linguistic presupposition, 
he will delineate the criteria for its use. Thus he will 
off .r a partial description or the grammar or t.he meaning 
of this concept. 
12 
One of the first moves in his anal.ysis to show that 
when one u:t't#ers the expression nI know that ••• ", one is 
not referring to one's mental state. One is doing some-
thing, not describing what one is doing. He writes• "I 
know seems to describe a state or affairs whieh guarantees 
what is known, ~antees it as a f'act.. One always forget.s 
the expression •I thought I knew• ... (C-12) 
How does he go about showing this? Im•~ine the fol-
lowing ai'tllation1 call it SituationJ:. A. "That 1a a new 
police a.:raow.-ad personnel. carrier." a. "Ho, it isn't." 
A. *'I know that it is. Look at the emblem of the Chicago 
Police Department." B. ttOh, now I see itl" One of th• 
ways someone would say that an.other person knows something 
is tha't tha:t person is ready to give grounds for what he 
knows. To use the upreesion "I know that ..... , one haa 
tfo be able, it requ•ted, to tell how one knows.(C-484) 
' 
On the other hand, if sp.av A could not tell "how 
he knows", one would rebuke him tor saying that he knew, 
tttou didn't know at all.a Here the r~seion •I know 
One of' the criterion ror 'th• use or the expression 
"I kn.ow that ••• tt a that one is ready and oan, 1f' ao ra-, 
qu.ated, •tat• his grounds, or .. how I know... P\lt more 
formally, "'I know -that ... ' in cont,at l, 1s being ready, 
it requested, to state ones grounda".(C-18) 
r 
A final interesting, and L11portant point about this 
illustration. Speaker A's original utterance asserted 
something being the case, i.e. that the vehicle is a 
police personnel carrier. 'l'his statement was reasserted 
in his reply to speaker B. In both utterances the ooi-
rectness of the statement depends on tJ>.e evidence which 
is ofi'ered. 
When questioned, speaker A uttered "I know that ••• ". 
This expression is used at t.imes when there is some ques-
tion as regards the correctness or the statement. Notice 
tJ>.at this has little to do with the correctness of the 
statement. "I know that ••• " does not guarantee that t.he 
statement is correct. It ju.st doesn't function that way. 
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Imagine the following situation• call it Sitllation 2. 
A. "Is that a cedar tree over there (pointing to a tree)?" 
B. "I know that it is, When I was a boy we had two of 
them in our front yard. Now look at the shape of the 
leaves." A. "Yes, its true, the leaves are •• ,".(C-176) 
Speaker A posed the question whe'ther the tree could or 
couldn't b• called a cedar tree. Speaker B, in answering 
th• question, did at least two things. 
First, he offered something from his pa.st experience 
' 
which would allow him w be in a position to know such 
things. He was brought up with cedar trees. Second, he 
offered evidence for calling this tree, here and now, a 
cedar tree. 
However, if speaker B was not in a position to know 
what he says he knows, A would not accept this statement 
that "he knows that...... Consider the situation where 
two friends are playing t:he stock market. Speaker A has 
played it £'or years, but speaker B is having his first 
go ati it. The stock B buys advances significantly, and 
he says• "I knew it would." Spealcer A then respon•s, 
"The hell you didJ it's only a lucky guess." 
14 
Returning to §iYJ!a~qn ~2· The evidence is accepted 
by speaker A as showing that the statement is true. This 
ovidenoe is all that is needed in this situation. U 
speaker A still was not eonvinced that this waa all that 
was needed to show that 1ihat was a cedar tree, he would 
ask for further evidence. Speaker B would hav• o.f'£ered 
it. Note that th$l"'e must be the possibility of deciding 
the truth or f'alsity 0£ the statement. U speaker B could 
not have shown that it was true, speaker A would not have 
accepted B'a statement that he knew. 
More formally, it can be put as followst "I know, in 
cont.ext 2, means that there a a possibility ot showing 
that p is 1U'Uen.(C-24)) 
Now consider the following situation• call it SJtQ!-
, 
!tW!l l• It takes plaoe at a cock-tail party. A. *'Haven'tt 
I met you be.fore?" B. "No, I don't think so". A."Yes, I 
have, in Bulgaria". B. *'Not you couldn*t have. I hav• 
never been there". A. "Why yes I have met youn. B. "No, 
I know that you ha.ven•ti I have never been out o£ North 
America!" In this situation, it ia 1.mponant to observe 
that wht:m speaker B stated •I know t.hat ••• " it was not an 
expression ot his readiness for his stateiaent 1;0 be oon-
firmed. He was not expressing his willingness to have 
hie grounds or evidence checked for their tNthf'ulnesa. 
15 
I£ he had, he mig.bt have said "I believe t.hat I have never 
been ou:t ••• " Rather, "I know that ••• ,. implies .. .,_wUder-
men t" if what he said was not confirmed.(0-J).3) Wittten-
stein writ.es of the use or "I know that ..... in situations 
like J, "I know• I am familiar with it as a oert.ain'tiy."(C-272) 
In completing our r•construction of Wittgenstein•s 
analysis of the ooncept "l ilnow", consider the following 
situa1aont oaU it §itw!l.ieB ~· A. "I know tba't that's a 
cedar u-ee over there." B. "You really believe that?" 
A. nyea, look at the way the leaves area shaped." Our 
.first point 1s that when speaker A states "I know .. , he 
also is willing to stat,e •1 believe ... (0-171) 
It might be objected that though "I believe" and "I 
know1' assert the aatQe airtatement, they exclude one another. 
If "I know p" it would. ~ wrong £or me to say uI believe p•, 
because this woul.d suggest that I do not. know it. If', in 
knowing p, I am asked whether I believe p, I would retort, 
. 16 
nNo, I know P"• But this is not a serious objection. In 
a parallel case, I would mislead someone if I described 
my parents as people I live with. Asked whether they are 
people I live with I would say, "No, they are my parents". 
Nevertheless I live with my parents. 
that I do not merely live with them. 
What is true is 
Similarly, if "I 
know p", ! do not merely believe p, but still "I believe 
p."(C-425) 
A more powerful argument against a criterion for the 
use of the concept "I know• in terms of "I believe" is 
that people can, it seems, know something to be the ease 
and yet re.fuse, or seem Wl&ble, to bring themselves to 
believe it. A mother who is told by a reliable witness 
with a great deal of circumstantial detail that her child 
has been murdered by being pushed into a river by another 
child might be in such a situation. Wittgenstein's 
approach ~ this di.f.ficulty is to say that. although she 
has conclusive grounds for believing that her child is 
dead, she does not, in fact, believe it or know it. To 
have compelling grounds is one thing, but t.o recognize 
them as compelling is another thing. (C-2.)9) 
Witt.genst,ein has partially described the speaker's 
' 
use or the concept "to knowtt in cODSmon linguistic situa-
tions. From his analysis we have .formulated the following 
points about the grammar or this expression. "'I know', 
in common linguistic contexts, means being able, if 
requested, to state one's grounds for Pt to show the 
possibility o:f p being true, to offer one•s position 
for knowing p, and to believe P"• It has also been 
shown, that '"I know that ... , in situation J, means 
"an unwillingness to have one's grounds for p, ones 
position tor p, the t.ruth of p, and the belief in p, 
testeda", though in the other situations there is an 
implied willingness to entertain the possibility of 
th• statement being mistaken. 
Furthermore, it is interesting that one uses the 
expression in situations where there is a possibility 
ot a contradiotion or questioning on the part of 
another.(C-424) When there is no question, or no 
wish to emphasize linguistically what one is about, 
the expression "I know" is not used. 
This observation should not be considered a criti-
cism. That one doesn't utter the expression in speaking 
about what is the case is not a shortcoming or lack of 
exactitude on our part. Rathert people communicate 
tacts about the WO:"ld and themselves to one another. 
It is accepted t*lat when ?ne communicates £acts one 
knows these tacts to be true. This is what tactual 
discourse is for. 
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We have already mentioned the expression "to believe••. 
It was shown that the criteria. for the use of the expression 
"I know that ••• " is related to that of the expression "I 
believe that ...... 'the latter is similar to the form.er in 
that neither ia a description of one•s mental state.(C-42) 
It is not an expression ref erring to an inner process. 
Observe the following situation: call it ~ityatiM ;j:• 
A. •1 believe that John is coming... B. "No, he said he was 
going out of town... A. "I know he is. There is his car 
coming llP 'the street". B. "No, it is not. That is a newer 
model".(C-42) It is important to note that in this illus-
tration the truth of speaker A's stat•ent was in question, 
but that he believed it wasn't. When a person objects to 
another believing a statement, he says "You shouldn•t be-
lieve that ••• ", and not "You don•t believe that ••• •. 
One can ask. it one is curious or genuinely interested 
in the truth of a statement made, "How do you know?.. It 
is never asked, "How do you believe?" One mu.st state how 
he is in a position tor making the statement and one must 
state hie grounds for the truth o:t the statement. If 
these two conditions are not satisfied one will say, ttYou 
don't know at aU•. 
One does ask, "Why do you believe?"; but never, "Why 
do you know?" Here it 1s not necessary that one gives his 
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groW'lds, or i.f one does, they can be scattered references.(<:-550) 
The use of the expression "I believe that ••• " does not 
have, as one of it;s linguistic presuppositions ·the possi-
bility of o!'fering one's grounds or evidence". It is im-
portant to realize this. What one believes about the 
world are the sorts of things which are "groundless".(C-166) 
They are the sorts of things that have no special way of 
being tested. 
Furthermore, one doesn't say, "He is in a position 
to believe that." Rather one says, "It is reasonable to 
assume that in this situation ••• •• It is not part of cri-
teria for the use of "I believe that ••• " that one can 
give one's position for believing a statemsnt. However, 
it is possible that one can decide whether it is reasonable 
in such-and-such a situation to assume this or that with 
confidence. This is the case even though what ie believed 
is false.(C-556) 
In summation, one believes ~ some statement or 
other is true, or that some state or a.ff airs is or is 
not the ease. "I bol1eve that ••• " is followed by an as-
sertion, i.e. a statement. It was shown that ttI believe 
that ••• " means "that one can st.ate why one holds the 
statement, though it is not necessary to off er grounds 
.for the truth of the statement". Though part of the cri-
teria of "I believe that ••• " is not "being in a position", 
one can and does speak of it "being reasonable in such-
a.nd-such a situation to assume the statement." 
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It is important to recognize that people act accord-
ing to a system of propositions which are believed, but 
they very rarely verbally formulate these. One believes 
what people transmit in a certain manner. In this way 
geographical, historical, religious, and psychological 
facts are communicated.(C-170) As a child, by instruction 
and observation, one is taught to accept these things and 
act upon them. One is initiated into a culture unified 
by science and education. 
To see that this is an initiation, a form of ritua-
lized training, imagine a child in the following classroom 
situation {Situation 6), questioning a particular geogra-
phical proposition which is held as true. A. "How do we 
know that corn is grown in Indiana?" B • .. Well, this book 
was written by a man who knows these things." A. "But do 
we have to believe that just because he writes ••• " B. "You 
will never learn geography if you don't stop asking such 
silly questions!"(C-283) One is taught "to believe in" a 
vast number of things and, only after one accepts and 
acts upon this system, is one allowed to question some 
propositions within it. In "knowing that ••• " and "believing 
that" p is the case, and conversely to "doubt that" p is 
the case, one is first taught "to believe in" an entire 
system of propositions.(C-114) 
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One final comment before proceding to Wittgenstein's 
analysis of the concept "to doubt". First "I believe 
that ••• " and "I believe in ••• " are used in situations 
where there are needs for verbal stage-setting. When 
people communicate facts to one another, as we have seen,. 
they a.re expected to communicate what they know. This is 
what factual discourse is all about. Usually there is no 
need to position utterances with the expression .. I know 
that ••• .,. Similarly, people are expected t.o believe the 
facts they know. They act like persons act when they 
believe and at times can be said to know what they be-
lieve. Sometimes this activity takes the form of verbal 
utterances, that one believes certain facts. 
Wittgenstein's analysis of the axpression "to doubt•• 
has already been introduced in illustration 6. The ques-
tioning of the child was countered by the teacher's 
offering grounds for the truth of her original statement. 
Yet when the child continued in his doubt about the truth 
of these groWlds, the teacher rebuked him. for his non-
sensical question.(C-JlO) The teacher didn't answer the 
child's question because within the context his doubt was 
a groundless one. The child was doubting what had to be 
' 
accepted in learning geography. Obviously when one uses 
the expression "I doubt that ..... one must "offer his par-
ticular groWlds for questioning".(C-122) It should also 
22 
be noted that ~'I doubt that ••• ff functions in a similar way 
to "I know that.ff or "I believe that••, in that it does not 
offer a description of a mental state of affairs. Rather, 
it is part of an activity which we call "doubting a par-
ticular proposition which purports to be a statement about 
the world".(G-359) 
In the following explication, we will want to separate 
doubts of three different sorts: those which are reason-
able, those which are unreasonable, i.e. superfluous, and 
finally those doubts which are logically impossible, i.e. 
doubts which are no doubts at all,(C-453) This last sort 
of doubt will be given only a preliminary description. The 
full import of it can only be understood in relation to 
Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore's article on the "Proof 
for the existence of the external world". 
Imagine the following situation: call it §ixuation z. 
A. "We can explain the rise in food prices by increased 
expenditures for t.he ·war effort." B. "No, we cannot. If' 
you look at the statistics from 1950-2 you will see that 
our involvement in Korea ••• " A. "This is true, but ••• ".(C-335) 
Here is the normal give and take of a statement asserted 
and doubts raised as to its truthfulness. Speaker B ex-
presses doubts about the statement, speaker A makes and 
off era his grounds or evidence for the falsity of the 
statement. In this case one would say that speaker B 
offered his doubts and showed the reasonableness of this 
doubt by stating his evidence. More formally, "'I doubt 
that ••• •, in context a, is being able, it requested, to 
offer one's grounds against the truth of the statement." 
It is also interesting to note that the reasonableness of 
the grounds is contingent upon speaker A accepting the 
evidence. But this is not contingent upon any decision 
on speaker A's part.(C-271) Statistical evidence is what 
is called "good grounds" in economics. As a student 
speaker A was taught to accept this type of evidence as 
good evidence.(C-608) 
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Using the same illustration, a third party joins the 
conversation. c. "Gentlemen, Gentlemen, it seems to me 
that your discussion is a fruitless one." A. and B. •'Why?" 
C. ''Your use of statistics invalidates your so-called ex-
planations". A. ••we realize that the statistical method 
has many shortcomings such as ••• , but we take these into 
account when using them". c. "Yes, but you can never get 
to the truth with a mere correlation of a certain limited 
set of phenomenon". B. "Your doubts are unacceptable. To 
be sure we don•t get all the facts for some ideal explana-
tion. But this is the truth as far as we can know it". In 
this discussion a further step has been taken. Our third 
questioner has offered doub~s not only of the wvidence or 
grounds for the truth of a sta'tement, but has also rejected 
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the method for obtaining the truth of statement and others 
similar to it. 
In response to speaker C's objections, speaker A and 
B accept the difficulties involved in the use of the sta-
tistical method, but have no better one to offer. They 
will call speaker C's doubts unreasonable and wiacceptable 
for he off era grounds which have been considered before 
by the two researchers. Speaker C only offers the possi-
bility of doubting as the ground for overthrowing a me-
thodological principle in search of ideal explanations. 
This possibility has not been found acceptable for there 
are no grounds for it. It is "merelyw possible.(C-392) 
A fourth party joins our group. D. "It seems to me 
that the whole of the previous discussion is futile. The 
explanation you seek, the principles you use, 'the evi-
dence you off er are all quite meaningless to the real 
question." c. "Well• well, it's difficult to respond to 
your attack. I don't know really where to begin. I'm 
not exactly sure what you mean. In what way is it mean-
ingless?". ( C-24) 
What is of interest in this conclusion to the illus-
tration is that speakers A, B, and C are confronted with 
one who objects 00 the totality of principles• propositions, 
evidence, etc., which is called the "science of economics." 
They find it difficult to engage in a discussion with 
their objector in that they are not clear in what way 
they should "argue" for the truth of their science. 
Indeed, what would count as "true" for them does not 
seem to hold for their objector. 
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To "argue" one uses certain principles, propositions, 
evidence, etc., in supporting or denying a proposition 
or set of them. But here there is no method or argumen-
tation. One is not sure what ••argument" means here. 
What is asked for is an explanation of the meaning of D's 
utterances. IT one cannot be assured of an aacepted 
base for speaking for or against certain propositions, 
can one be assured of the meaning of the objector's 
utterances?(C-456) To be more precise, can what the 
objector is doing be called "dout>ting"? We had offered 
the aspects of the criteria for saying that "He is doub-
ting" in our .first two parts of this illustration. w;hat 
speaker D is doing seems to be something similar to 
this yet we would not want to call this "a doubt". 
Perhaps speakers A, B, and C would conclude that speaker 
D was "mentally upset". They would suppose that normal 
people do not doubt like ~hat.(C-255) 
We now turn to Wittgenstein's analysis of the concept 
"to be certain .. , No better introduction could be given 
concerning the question, "What is meant by the truth of 
tho proposition •1s certain •7•• than \lw'hen Wittgenstein 
writes: 
••• With the word '*certain" we express complete 
conviction, the total absence of doubt and 
thereby we seek to convince ot~er people. 3ut 
when is something objectively certain? When a 
mistake is not possible. .But what kind of 
possibility is that? ~Iustn't a mistake be 
logically excluded?(C-194) 
This distinction that Wittgenstein draws is remini-
scent of one given ·1n historical introductions to the 
problem of certitude. That is, "certainty" has been 
taken to be either a state o:f' mind or a relational pro-
perty of propositions or statements. The task now is 
to separate and delineate these two sorts of certainty. 
To see this obsene the following situation: call 
it ~~1;)&a-X,ign .~. A. "Is that a oedar tree over there?" 
B • .,Yes, it is. I am certain that it is. Look at ..... 
Here "I am certain that ..... functions in a way similar to 
"I am sure ••• ", "I am familiar ••• ", and "I am comfortable 
with ••• ", in that speaker B was offering how he was 
holding "that is a cedar treett.(C-194) 
It should be noted. that in this illustration speaker 
B's holding the statement as certain was not a condition 
frOll'l which he inferred the truth of the statement. Ra-
ther, he offered his grounda to A for the truth of the 
statement. 
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These grounds a.re ones which could be subject to dispute, 
and B could be mistaken. So the use of' "I am certain that" 
is not a condition f'or the truth of' the statement, though 
it is a description of how B holds the statement,(C-)0) 
Following Witt-gen.stein, it was stated that "I am 
certain that ••• • is a psychological concept used in a 
description of one's relation to an assertion. Now it 
can be asked what are the criteria tor the identification 
and ascription of this expression to a person? One will 
•ay that "he is certain that ••• • when the speaker acts 
as one "who does DOt have the slightest doubt that that 
is a cedar treeJ that he is convinced that that is a 
cedar tree and will attempt to convince others in his 
particular situation that that is a cedar tree." 
It one didn't behave in a way similar to the above 
when he uttered the expression •r am certain that ••• •, 
one would say that this person was lying or didn't under-
stand the meaning of his words. Imagine a ticket agent 
who stated that he was certain that the train would arrive 
at 10105 1 yet, while saying this, he was hurriedly looking 
up time schedules, rubbing his head, sitting in an uneasy 
position, etc. One would say that perhaps he uttered the 
expression as a joke in revealing that he wasn•t really 
certain at all when the train would arrive. 
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In this regard, if one ut'tered a statement without 
the linguistic cue "I aai cert.a.in that ••• " and if ones 
behavior was similar to the eriterion of'.fered above, one 
could say "he is certain that ••• " In other words, the 
utterance of the expression "I am certain that ••• tt is 
only one of the criteria for people engaged in "certainty 
behavior". 
Wittgenstein otf ers another way of understanding the 
concept "to be certain". This is "Objective Certainty", 
where a mistake about the truthfulness of propositions is 
"logically" ex.eluded. The linguistic game in which speakers 
part.icipate ex.eludes certain sorts of propositions within 
it trom being mistaken. It one doesn't hold these sorts 
of propositions as being certain then he would not be 
playing the game according to the rules.{C-446) 
What is here described is not the use of "to be cex-
tain" as in "I am certain that ••• " which is a description 
of a "psychological state", but rather that, 'the growids 
for 'the tNthf'ulness of propositions are certain, i.e., 
"It. is certain that ••• ". Tba't the grounds for the state-
ment are certain is not something any particular person 
can decide upon. Rather it is determined by the game they 
are involved in. (c-;6) On the relationship between pro-
positions which a.re certain and the use o£ .. I am certain 
that ••• " Wittgenstein writes that they just hang together.(0-31)) 
For a clearer understanding of this, observe the 
following: {l) "I am certain that is a cedar tree", and 
{2) "I am certain that I am R.M." It has already been 
shown that in uttering (1), the speaker was describing 
how he holds to this proposition, yet the proposition's 
truthfulness is veri.fied by ascertaining whether the 
grounds that the latter offers are sufficient. If 
speaker A questioned the truth of the statement, spea-
ker A wasn't questioning whether speaker B in tact held 
the proposition as a certainty, i.e. whether he believed 
it was certain. It could turn out that they may look 
closer at the tree and discover that it wasn't a cedar 
tree at all. Here and in many other like situations 
mistakes are possible and do occur. 
Now imagine the following situation1 call it Situa-
tiQn 2· A man receives a caller at his home. The caller 
questions him in regard to his identity. A. "I am R.M." 
B. "Are you really?" A. "I am certain of it. I lived 
here for the las't five years, here comes my wire. This 
must be a friend's prae'tical joke•. B. "No it isn't. I 
would off er evidence that you really are not who you say 
you are." A. "I refuse to allow any such thing. This 
whole thing is absurd".(C-577) In this situation speaker 
A refuses to accept any evidence to the eftect that he is 
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not R.M.(C-381) To give up or entertain as doubt.ful his 
identity, speaker A would have to question a set of re-
lated propositions which he also holds as eertain• i.e. 
where he lives, how old he is, what he does for a living, 
etc., and speaker A will not allow this. For speaker A 
ev•rything, i.e. all his past experiences, speak in favor 
of his being R.M. and nothing speaks against it. These 
would conclusively prove that he is 1n faot R.M.(C-594) 
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That. these grounds are conclusive is premised on the 
f aot that people a.re brought up to accept many proposi-
tions as certain, and the grounds which one has for them 
are considered conclusive. In normal circumatances people 
know with a maximum degree of certainty what their names 
are, where they live, what they do for a living, and one 
doesn't doubt in normal circumstances that they could be 
"mistaken" about these things.(C-529) If one was mistaken 
about where he put his keys this is nothing unusual, but 
what would one say of a person who was mistaken about his 
identity? Would one say that he made a .. mistake" in the 
same sense as being mistaken about his keys?(C-JOO) No 
one just. doesn't make mistakes about ones identity. 
To clarity this last point, Wittgenstein obser'tes 
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that mistakes not only have a. "cause•, but they also have 
a "ground".(C-74) When scxneone makes a mist.alee it can in 
most circumstances be fitted into what he knows. If 
one is •mistaken" about where he left his keys, he still 
knows he is in the right house, he knows that he has 
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just come home from work, etc. Here there is a mistake 
about one particular point within a field or points. 
However, the ease of s0B1eone who made a "mistake" about 
his identity is different. Jim Smith said he was Jesus 
Christ and lived in Galilee. ( c-67) He would be "mistaken" 
about his whole field and not just one or a couple of 
points within it. au.t this kind of ''mistake" is usually 
called "insanity". One would say perhaps that he was 
*'temporarily confused and disorient,ed" and this is not 
a "mistake".(C-71) 
Completing our explication or Wittgenstein's analysis 
of structure of certain epistemic concepts, his grammatical 
description of the concept t•proposition" will now be given. 
Wittgenstein writes that "our 'empirical propositions' do 
not form a homogeneous ma.ss".(C-21.3) He says "Here one 
must, I believe, remember that the concept 'proposition' 
itself is not a sharp one".(C-J20) Finally Wittgenstein 
says "It is clear that our empirical propositions do not 
a.ll have the same status., •• ",(C-167) 
Before entering into a detailed analysis of the con-
cept "proposition" we will offer the root metaphors that 
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Wittgenstein uses as the point of departure for his logical 
analysis. By root metaphor, what is meant is a somewhat 
systematic report,oir of ideas by means of which Wittgenstein 
describes, by analogical extension, the concept ttproposi-
tion•• where these ideas do not immediately and literally 
apply. 
First, Wittgenstein's use of the River Metaphor. He 
writes: 
••• It might be imagined that some propositions 
or the form ot empirical. propositions, were 
hard and functioned as channels for such empi-
rical propositions as were not hardened but 
.fluidf and that this relation al't#ered with 
time, in that fluid propositions hardened and 
hard onea become fluid.{C-96) 
Furt,her: 
••• And the bank of that river consists partly 
ot hard rock, subject to no alteration or 
only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, 
which now in one place now in another gets 
washing away or depoeited.(C-99) 
T'aen there is the picture metaphor. Wittgenstein 
writes that "Th• truth of certain empirical propositions 
belongs to our frame or reterence".(C-83) And againi 
••• But I did not get my picture of the world 
by satisfying myself or its correctness1 nor 
do I have it because I am satisfied of its 
correctness. Not it. ia the inherited back-
ground against whici\ I distinguish between 
true and false. (C-99) 
Finally: 
In general I take as true what is found in 
text-books of geography for e.."<am.ple. Why? 
! aay: all these facts have been confirmed 
a hu..11dred times over. But how do I know 
that? What is my evidence for it? I have 
a world-picture. Is it true or false? 
Above all it is the substratum of all my 
inquiring and asserting. The propositions 
describing it are not all equally subject 
to testing.(C-162) 
Here Wittgenstein is not so much arguing a position 
for the correct description of the concept "proposition", 
as attempting to change a philosopher's associations 
whieh surround the mention of this concept. What gener-
ally are these associations? 
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It is that propositions aret (L) Analytic, or the 
truth of the proposition is determined by the meaning of 
the terms which constitute the proposition. Thus nsache-
lors are unmarried males" is true because "unmarried male" 
defines or is a logically essential characteristic of 
"bachelor." The relationship which obtains between the 
propositions "John is a bachelor• and .. John is an ummar-
ried male•• is one of logical entailmentJ and (,_) Synthet,ic, 
or the truth of the proposition is determined by its me-
thod of veri:f"ication. Synthetic propositions give one in-
formation about tho world, and the relationship between 
any two ot them is a eontengent rather then logical one. 
Wittgenstein suggests, in the above, that there are 
propositions which at the surface appear to be empirical 
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or synthetic. However, when he offers an analysis of 
their .functioning, i.e. meaning, he discovers that they 
are rather the frame through which, or the bedrock upon 
which empirical propositiona have t.heir meaning. Fui-
therm.ore, they cannot be considered analytic. 
That "framework propositions" are not analytic ob-
serve the following. What is the relationship between 
someone's engaging in doubting behavior and his being 
in doubt? Obviously the tie between the two is not a 
strictly logical one. It is not a. matter of entailment. 
It is perfectly conceivable, in almost any given case, 
that the statement of' a :rramework proposition be true 
while its related empirical proposition is false. 
The characterization of the sort of propositions 
which Wittgenstein metaphorically calls fluid or those 
within the framework of a picture will be given first. 
In analyzing one of the functions of this concept a 
partial description of i'ta grammar will be presented. 
One final point before proceding to our explication. 
In developing - as an introduction to Wittgenstein's 
grammatical descriptions - his concepts of "grammar," 
"rule," "game,• and "cri~eria" - it was mentioned that 
though he does not use the concept "criterion" there is 
overwhelming textual support that something like the 
tool .. criteria" is used in .QB Cert:a!zltI• It will now be 
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shown that Wittgenstein's analysis of the concept "propo-
sition" is an extension of his wierstanding of ttoriterion". 
Take an expression which has been u.<3ed on numerous 
previous occasions in this essay: .. that is a cedar tree" 
(pointing to a tree). What was happening in the linguistic 
situation where the speaker uttered these words? As we 
have seen that utterance was one that could be tested, i.f 
the situation required it. If speaker B was not satisf~ed 
that the tree pointed to was a cedar tree, speaker A would 
have to show why the tree could be called a cedar tree. 
?here was, then, the possibility that this utterance could 
be tested. Therefore if one were to ask what sort of thing 
an "empirical proposition" is, the answer would follow 
that it is an utterance which i~ testable. More formally 
••empirical proposition", in this context, is "an utterance 
which is testablen.(C-109) 
It was stated that "empirical propositions are test-
able". L~ order to extend our explication, it now should 
be asked what do tests do? Wittgenstein mentions a va-
riety of descriptions which characterize utterances which 
are testable. Most importantly they can bes (1) "correct 
or mistaken .. , (2) "true qr false .. , (.3) "evidence can be 
offered for or against them", (4) "supported or denied by 
groWlds", and (5) "justi.fied in some way". 
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If from the number of remarks made about what we shall 
call "bedrock propositions" or ".framework propositions" one 
could determine their interest .for Wittgenstein, then it 
could be stated tha~ it far outweighs his concern for em-
_ ±rical propositions. Indeed empirical propositions are 
mentioned only in relation to his more extensive discussion 
of "framework propositions... But this would be misleading, 
for as we shall see empirical propositions can only be 
understood in light o.f his clarification o.f other types 
of propositions used in our talk about the world. 
"Framework" or "bedrock propositions" a.re, to say the 
least, norms, methodical principles, or rules for determi-
ning the correctness of something. wb.at is this something 
which they determine? They are rules for a variety of 
different things. As we have seen they are used to decide 
whether a person knows something, whether he believes some-
thing, whether a person is making a mistake, whether "x" 
is a cedar tree, whether "y" is a police armoured personnel 
carrier, etc. Here we are not determining the way the 
world is, but rather that one calls that particular object 
a cedar tree. 
The utterances for which there are framework proposi-
tions or statements, are ones which the speaker has a way 
of showing to be true, justified, correct or grounded. All 
utterances of this sort have bedrock propositions governing 
their use. 
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In that "proposit1onstt are human norms, i.e. methodo-
logical principles, framework propositions are always pro-
po•itions of some person or group of persons. As with 
Wittgenstein's earlier notion of criterion, this is an 
important point, because one must not confuse bedrock 
propositions with necessary and sufficient conditions. 
It is absurd to hold that the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a cedar tree growing are different from 
one person to another. Necessary and sufficient conditions 
are something in the world; they are not a matter which 
is subject to linguistic determination. With the case 
of bedrock propositions the case is different. There 
may be a divergence from. person to person. 
Bedrock propositions are abbitrary, 1n the sense 
that there need be no justitication for bedrock proposi-
tions being what they are. To use the picture metaphor 
for a moment, Wittgenstein writes ff! did not get my pic-
ture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; 
nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. 
Nos it is the inherited background against which I distin-
guish between true or false".(C-94) There is no need to 
justify t.he truth of bedrock propositions for they are what 
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we use 1n detennining what, is true and what is false, i.e. 
empirical propositions. To ask whether they are true or 
false is a question which soon loses its force. 
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"Bedrock propositions" are internalized in linguistic 
practice. People who are engaged in this activity m.ay be 
quite unable to say what they are. Wittgenstein writes: 
"the propositions describing this world-picture might be 
part of a kind of mythology, and their role is like t.hat 
of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely 
practically, without learning any explicit rules".(C-95) 
These bedrock propositions are generally rough and 
imprecise. rheir acknowledged use in normal circumstances, 
rather than their precision is what makes them useful.{C-373) 
Then again their lac~ of exactitude is only a lack from 
the perspective of a formalized system such as formal 
logic. From the standpoint of human communication they 
are as precise as they need to be. The roughness of 
bedrock propositions can be exemplified in two ways. 
First, the framework for "'x' is a cedar tree" determines 
the evidence that shows "'x' is a cedar tree" is a true 
or false proposition; and to say whether some set of cir-
cumstances are of this sort or not requires discrimination 
that is not determined by the bedrock propositions and is 
only given in practice.(C-1)9) Second, the roughness of 
bedrock propositions shows itself in one*s inability to 
say exactly what bedrock propositions are for simple utter-
ances like 0 making a mistake". (C-28) 
Bedrock propositions presuppose circumstances of 
application. This feature is apparent in cases where 
there are many different bedrock propositions for a 
linguistic utterance. The vast majority of empirical 
propositions have several complementary bedrock propo-
sitions. (C-27) Moreover, there may be fluctuations be-
tween bedrock propositions for linguistic expressions 
and empirical propositions which serve as "evidence" 
for, the utterance. The same propositions may get trea-
ted at one time as something to test by experience and 
as a. rule for testing. Wittgenstein writes, "It is 
clear that our empirical propositions do not all have 
t.he same status, since one can lay down such a. proposi-
tion and turn it .from an empirical proposition into a 
norm of deseription".(C-167) This is not to say that 
all we have are empirical propositions.(C-423) There 
is not sharp boundary between t.he two. but the lack of 
sharpness 1§ that of boundary between rule a.nd empirical 
propositions.(C-J09t31S and 319} 
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This fluctuation between bedrock and empirical propo-
si tions is premised on the fact of the contextual charac-
ter of bedrock propositi~ns. A linguistic situation has 
a certain purpose and certain presuppositions and bedrock 
propositions are among these presuppositions. But not 
all linguistic situations have t.he same purpose or pre-
suppositions.. So what may oe taken as grammatical,. i.e. 
bedrock proposition in one situation could in another be 
an empirical proposition. 
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lt'inaJ.ly, we can pose the difficult question whether 
there aan be a conflict between different bedrock propo-
sitions. In one sense, no, there could not be a con.flict. 
If our bedrock propositions ceased to coincide, the propo-
sition to which they are related would dissolve in that 
the expression would have no clear use. In light of 
this fact it is very difficult to see what sense there 
would be in continuing to give the designation "bedrock 
proposition° to those phenomena which have been coWlted 
as bedrock propositions. If there were no bedrock propo-
sitions, ther$ could be no conflict between them. That 
this is the case can be better realized when it is re-
called that bedrock propositions are human products with 
regular uses, and their application presupposes oircum-
stances which frequently obtain, and where these circum-
stances do not obtain our propositions do not apply and 
thus lose their sense. 
It has been shown that within the language game it 
is impossible to have a conflict over bedrock propositions. 
The quest.ion now ean be ~ked whether something i"rom out;-
side a part.icu.la.r language game can cause a conflict in 
bedrock propositions. \ihat will now b• shown is that there 
is a possible conflict between two linguistic systems. 
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Wittgenstein poses the question whether it is "wrong" 
to guide one's actions according to propositions of phy-
sics. Is one to say that one has no "good grounds0 for 
the propositions of physics? Wittgenstein remarks, "Isn't 
precisely this what we call a •good ground'".(C-608) 
His point is that in our culture having "good grounds" 
for something being the case is having propositions which 
are articulated by the science of physics. 'l'o ask whether 
the grounds offered by physics are "good grounds" would 
be pointless. *'Good grounds" are grounds which are for-
mulated by physics. We first accept and acknowledge this 
for we have been initiated in a culture which is unified 
by science and education. 
What would happen if one were to meet a people who 
did not accept this as a telling reason? Instead of 
physics they would consult an oracle. This is what they 
accept as having "good grounds". The question whet.her 
these grounds are "good grounds" would be as pointless 
for them as the question whether the grounds of physics 
are good grounds for us. 
Now if one were to confront a person from this other 
culture with the asserti<>n .. the sun is a large gaseous 
mass•, he might retort that "the sun is a hole in the 
sky•. What one has here is a conflict over what it means 
"to be the sun". If our disputants were to offer their. 
groWlds for their concepts of the sun - "A large gaseous 
mass" or "a hole in the sky" - neither would accept the 
other's grounds as being "good grounds". 
If one called the other "wrong" Wittgenstein writes, 
"Aren't we using our language-game as a base t'rom which 
to combat theirs".(C-609) He also writes, .. I said I 
would 'combat• the other man, - but wouldn't I give him 
reasong? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end 
of reasons comes persµ1sion (think what happens when mis-
sionaries converted natives). "(C-612) 
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We have now brought to a conclusion our explication 
ot .Qn Cer!faintx with its view towards the positive charac-
terization which Wittgenstein offers of the structure of 
factual discourse. First presented was Wittgenstein's 
formulation of the "grammar" and "criteria" for talk about 
the world. With these philosophical. tools at hand, we 
followed Wittgenstein in offering the criteria for a set 
of epistemic concepts. The linguistic presuppositions 
of these concepts were disclosed in bringing their meaning 
to 'the fore. We now turn to Wittgenstein's description 
of the limits of this structure, 1n relationship to the 
' 
status of propositions about the existence of the physical 
world. 
Ci-1AP1'ZR TWO 
WITTGENSTEIN'S CRirIQlh~ OF .t400RE'S RZJECTION 
OF THE SCEPTICAL DOU3T3 AS TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 
l'hough this chapter will off er a further explication 
of Wittgenstein's analysis of the epistemic concepts given 
grammatical descriptions in the previous chapter, our fo-
cus will no longer be on the normal circU!'llstances of their 
use. We will not precede in a further delineation of the 
grammar of these concepts by way of an analysis of their 
criteria which is the linguistic presUflposition of these 
normal circumstances. Rather, our analysis will explicate 
his grammatical descriptions through his observations of 
the abnormal occasions of their use. The value of these 
observations are that through them the limits of the 
meaning of these concepts will be given. 'rhis will also 
be a description of the grammar of these epistemic conoepts 
but now by observing situations where there are no criteria 
for their use. 
What sort of abnormal circumstances does Wittgenstein 
primarily concern himself with? The examples given, in 
On Certainty, are those in which G. E. Moore rejects the 
sceptic's arguments against certainty as regards the exis-
tence of the physical world. In offering instances of 
abnormal situations, Wittgenstein will offer a description 
of the "philosophical use" of epistemic concept. 
4.3 
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Wittgenstein offers no clear indication, in his 
scattered remarks on Moore, to which article in parti-
cular he is at any given time referring. The author has 
taken the liberty, in making this explication as clear 
and as true a.s possible to Wittgenstein's analysis, of 
dividing Wittgenstein's remarks into two broad categories. 
First to be taken up is his criticism of "A Defense of 
Gommon Sense"which seems to revolve around Moore's use 
of the expression "I know that ••• ". Following this will 
be an explication of his criticism of "Proof of the 
External World", which seams to deal with t..1le sort of 
"proposition" Moore attempts to prove, the sort of "proof" 
he offers when he states "I know that ..... , and the "doubt" 
which this proof is to overcome. 
What Wittgenst.ein shows is that Moore takes the con-
cepts "to know", "proof", "proposition", and ttto doubt" 
out of their normal application in common discourse, and 
puts them to a specifically philosophical use. ·l'his use 
of these concepts transcends the limits of factual dis-
course in attempting to say what cannot be said. 
This production of factual nonsense is a consequence 
of Moore's attempting to offer a proof for the existence 
of the external world which he takes to be an epistemolo-
gical difficulty. Wittgenstein takes this apis~em.ological 
difficulty as a probl~n to be dealt with by an analysis 
of epistemic concepts. For Wittgenstein this epistemolo-
gical difficulty can only be resolved by a semantic 
analysis. (C-3) 
We leave to chapter three our final clarification 
of Wittgenstein's reflections on certainty as regards 
the existence of the physical. world. In explicating his 
remarks on the structure of £actual discourse, in light 
of the limits of i'ts meaningfulness, we will offer his 
views on the status of propositions about the existence 
of the physical world. 
3ECTION ONE 
The most pervasive criticism made by Wittgenstein 
on Moore's article 0 A De£ense of Common Sense•• is con-
tained in the following aphorism.6 He writes: 
••• Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I 
believe not. -For otherwise the expression 
"I Know" gets misused. And through the 
misuse a queer and extremely important 
mental state seems to be revealed.(C-6) 
In chapter one we had shown the specific use that is 
made with the expression "I know that ••• ••. We had shown 
that this expression is commonly used in circumstances 
where there is some possibility of a dispute about the 
proposition asserted. 
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6a.E. Moore, .. A Defense of Common Sense, .. in PhilosoJhi-
g§l: Papers, (New Yorks Collier Books Edition, 1962), pp.2-59. 
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We had also offered Wittgenstein's positive charac-
terization of the concept ttto know". With the clari.fication 
of the criteria oi' "I know that ..... , we gained a partial 
description of the grammar of "to know". In summarizing 
the results of that analysis, it was stated that .. I know 
that ••• ", in comm.on linguistic contexts, is being able, 
if requested, to state one's grounds for the statement, to 
be in a position to make the statement, to state the truth 
of the statement, and to believe the statement. Further-
more, it was shown that "I know that ••• ", in context J, 
means an unwillingness to have one's grounds for the 
statemei1t, one's position for the statement, the truth 
of the statement, and the belief in the statement, tested. 
Though in the other situation there was an implied willing-
ness to entertain theppossibility of the statement being 
mistaken. 
Moore, to the contrary, does not use the expression 
in either of the above manners. He state.st "I know with 
certainty that there exists at present a human body, which 
is my body, this body was born at a certain time in the 
past, and has existed continuously ever since", etc. He 
utters this in aircumst~ces where there is no one ques-
tioning him as to the truth of these assertions. Now we 
must ask, How does this expression get misused? 
Imagine the situation where Moore was questionsd on 
how long he has known such things as he has asserted. He 
would no doubt suggest that he has known them since the 
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time he could think about them. Here it is easy to be 
misled into conceiving of "knowing" as similar to "thinking•• 
in that they are both taken as mental states. 
So even when he hadn•t ut't#ered these assertions, say, 
a month before he wrote his essay, there was a "placeff 
where these assertions could be found. This "place" would 
be the "knowing process••. His utterances would be the 
external mani.f estation of the known thing which is somehow 
in his mind. When he does utter these assertions, their 
truth is assured by the f'aet that they ref er, are the 
manifesta.tion of, this mental state. This mental state 
is the ground for his utterances because they merely report 
a mental occurrence. Here the picture is complete. Moore 
has been deceived into conceiving "I know that ••• " as 
similar to "I am thinking" is similar to "I am certain", 
n1 am sure", in that it is a description of how one holds 
an assertion. But "I know that ••• ••, as we have seen, 
does not function that way. 
We have presented, in the above imaginary situation, 
the picture, i.e. theory, of what knowing is taken to be 
by G. E. Moore. This picture is a result of his misuse of 
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of the concept "to know". But we do not have Moore here to 
question. So we will, following Wittgenstein, approach and 
criticize Moore•s picture of knowing in an indirect manner. 
Even if we had Moore here to criticize, it is doubtful 
whether Wittgenstein, and this analysis in following him, 
could confront and criticize Moore's concept of knowing in 
a direct way. To the question "What is knowing?", we have 
imaginatively elicited an answer from Moore. If Wittgen-
stein rejected this and stated 0 No, knowing is ••• ", then 
he would fall wider the same illusion which captivates 
Moore. Wittgenstein would be offering just another con-
ception of what k."l.owing is. He would be replacing one pic-
ture with another, one theory with another. 
However, the uniqueness of Wittgenstein's method lies 
in the fact that he does not off er any philosophical theo-
ries. Yet his method is not merely an empirical observation 
of linguistic facts which would be utilized in anthropolo-
gical linguistics. Rather, these ordinary linguistic facts 
are used to dissolve philosophical pictures and the para-
doxes which arise from them. l'here are at least two approaches 
that Wittgenstein ta...~es in his criticism of Moore's concep-
tion of knowing. 
No better introduction can be given to Wit'tgenstein's 
first criticism than when he writes: 
••• Moore's view really comes down to this: 
the concept 'know' is analagous to the con-
cept.s 'believe', 'surmise•, 'doubt•, 'be 
convinced' in that the statement 'I know .... ' 
can't be a mistake and if that 1! so, then 
there ean be an in.f erence form such an 
utterance to the truth of an assertion. 
And here the form 'I thought I knew' is 
being overlooked.(C-21) 
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For Moore the expression "I mow that ••• " is conceived 
as guaranteeing the truth of the assertion. It functions 
tor him as a ground upon which the truth of the proposition 
depends. This ground is something which l.iloore personally 
has. It is something that he has an inner sense about. 
The expression "I know that ••• " is then merely a report 
on this inner sense. 
This would be a misunderstanding of the use of the 
concept "to know". Moore regards this expression as 
little subject to doubt as •I am convinced".(c-17a) One 
doesn't normally doubt that a person is convinced of what 
he knows. It may be suggested that he ought not be so 
sure, but his •state of conviction.. is not doubted. But, 
"I know that ••• " is under normal linguistic situations 
subject to doubt. One of the linguistic presuppositions 
of the concept •to known is that one can be •1n doubt" 
about the proposition as~erted. In attempting to use the 
concept "to know" as analogous to "to be convinced", Moore 
wants this concept to be used in a way that it means 
"a referral to a mental state that can not be doubted". 
Bu.t he has not established this new criterion. 
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In that Moore considers the utterance "I know that ••• " 
as little subject to doubt as "I am convinced", he has 
overlooked the expression °I thought I knew". (C-12) That 
this expression is used in normal discourse reveals the 
fact that the language-game of knowing is one wherein there 
is the possibility of doubting a proposition, and mistakenly 
holding a proposition to be a statement of what is the ease. 
This has been shown in Wittgenstein's characterization of 
the concept "to know". 
Within the language-game of knowing, the expression 
"I know that ••• n is used just in those circurnstances where 
the speaker recognizes that there is opposition to his 
statement. Furthermore, it was shown that part of the cri-
teria for the use of this expression is that there is the 
possibility of offering growids, or evidence for the truth 
of the assertion. If it is possible to show that the 
statement is correct by offering grounds, then there is the 
possibility of showing the doubtful character of the state-
ment by offering grounds which show that it is false. This 
is what Moore failed to see • 
.t'-.ioore wants the concept nto know" to function in a way 
similar to .,to be convinced", in that one could not be mis-
taken about what one knows. He holds, in effect, that "I 
know that ••• " means "can not be false". However, Moore has 
not established this new criteria. 
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l'he most that can be drawn from the use of the 
expression "I know that ••• " is that "he believes what he 
knows".(C-106) As Wittgenstein has sho~n, part of the 
linguistic presupposition of the expression '"I ~"'low that ••• '' 
is "I believe tha.t ••• tt. Therefore, from the fact that 
Moore "believes what he knows" to the truth of the propo-
sition he asserts is the gap of having to offer his grounds, 
his evidence, and his position for the truth of the assex-
tion. 
The second criticism which Wittgenstein levels against 
Moore's use of the expression "I know that ••• " will now be 
explicated. We have seen that part of the meaning of the 
concept "to know" is that "one is in a position"' to otfer 
growids or evidence tor the truth of a proposition. But 
a remarkable feature of Moore's use of the expression is 
that he relates propositions which everyone would be in 
a position to know.(C-100) 
One of'!'ers "one's position .. for knowing in those cix-
cumstances where there is some doubt raised as to whether 
one could be in a position to know the assertion uttered. 
But what sense does this make, if everyone is in a position 
to know that assertion? To avoid this contradiction, Moore 
must conceive of the concept "to know" as lacking, as one 
or its linguistic presuppositions, the possibility of being 
or not being '*in a position" to know. But this new criteria 
has not been justified by Moore. 
In summation, Moore t2-kes "I know that ..... as a 
revelation of an important mental state which guarantees 
the truth of the assertion made. This assertion is taken 
as being beyond doubt. That it is beyond doubt is also 
gro\J.nded 1n the mental state of lmowi.."l.g. These truths 
are euch that they are known by everyone. Finally• in 
that knowing iG a mental process and in that these truths 
are kno,,.,n to everyone, then anyone can readily recite 
those truths which are shared 'oy all. This is the phi-
losophical use of the concept "to know". 
However, the common meaning of "I know that ••• " is 
such that it is not a reference to an inner state which 
guarantees the truthfulness of the assertion. It does 
not off er a guarantee that the assertion is beyond doubt, 
and it it did, it would not do so by a referral to an 
inner state. "I know that ••• " is used to indicate that 
one is in a position to know, and this would be supei-
tluous if everyone was in a position to off er grounds 
for the assertion. FinallYt this expression is not used 
in circumstances where one recites a set of propositions 
bald to be true. 
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Before turning to Wittgenstein's criticism of Moore's 
"Proof for the Existence of the External World", we should 
note what positive significance, i.f any, Wittgenstein found 
in Moore's "A Defense of Common Sense". It should be noted 
that what follows will only take on its full significance 
when we turn in chapt..er three to Wittgenstein's positive 
clarification of certainty as regards the existanee of 
physical objects, though we will have cause to note again 
in this chapter. 
Vlittgenstein writes t..."1.at when Moore states such 
things about the world, he is really enumerating a lot 
of empirical propositions which we affirm without any 
special testing. In other words these propositions have 
a peculiarly logical role in the system of our empirical 
propositions.{C-lJ6) 
As we have seen, Moore's telling us that he knows 
such and such propositions can't satisfy the criteria 
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for calling these propositions true, and that he knows 
them to be true. Rather, it oan only be said that 1'he 
believes that he knows". For Wittgenstein, Moore's ass'lll-
anoes that he knows them is not or philosophical interest. 
However, tlle propositions are very interesting. Not be-
eaase anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, 
but because these propositions all have a similar role in 
the syst.em of our empirical judgments.(C-lJ7) 
For example, we do not arrive at them a.s a result of 
' 
investigation. There are biological investigations into 
the structure and relationship of various parts of the 
animal bodies, but not in~o whether animal bodies do exist 
or have a"Cisted a hundred years ago. 
us have in.formation a.bout this matter. 
Of course many of 
3ut couldn't 
information be wrong'? "Nonsense", one would say, "how 
eould all these people be wrong!" But is that an argu-
ment? Rather, isn't this simply a rejection of an idea? 
Would not this also be a determination of a concept? For 
if one speaks of a possible mistake here, does not this 
change the role of ••mistake" and "correctness•• in lan-
gu.aga? (C-lJS) 
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So though Wittgenstein takes objection to Moorets use 
of the concept «to know" in relation to the proposition he 
enumerates in "A Defense of Common Sense• - and one can 
extend this ~o the ones he enumerates in the "Proof of the 
External World" - he does see value in Moore's analysis. 
M'.oore has brought to light a group of role-related propo-
sitions. These are empirical propositions, yet they are 
not tested by any special investigation. They are propo-
sitions which people do not go about being mistaken about. 
Tha~ one is not "mistaken" about them is a result of their 
place in our language. 
SECTION TWO 
It is now time to give Moore's famous proof for the 
existence of the External. world. *'I can :prove now, for 
instance, that two hands exist. How? By holding up my 
two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with 
the right hand, "Here is one hand," and adding, as I make 
a oertain gesture with the le.ft, "and here is another.*' 
And if 1 by doing th.is, I have proved ipso facto the exis-
tence of external things, you will all see that I can 
also do it ••• 0 .7 
In taking up Witt,genstein•s objections to Moore's 
proof for the existence of the external world we will 
, 
concentrate on the following point~!& (l) the use of the 
concept "proof" in 14oore's essay, (2) the "doubt" which 
1s the occasion for of:fering the 1 proo.f, and (J) the sort 
o.f "propoaitiontt which is proved. 
Turning to the £1rst, Wit.tgenstein seems to accept 
that a valid proof should have the charaot~iatics whieh 
are mentioned by Moore in his article. These are (l) the 
premises differ from th• conolaaion, (2) one knows the 
premises to be t.rue, and (j) ·t;he conclusion logioally 
follows from the premises. But Wittgenstein will argue 
that Moore•s proof 1a no proof at all, because it fails 
to meet the above eri't«r1t\ for calling an ut.te:rance a 
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?a. E. Moore, "A Defense of Common Sense,• in Ph~oso­Pbic~ ~apers, (New York# Collier Books Edition, 19t>!!~ 
pp •. -;~. 
We have already given Wittgenstein •s analysis of the 
concept "to know" and have sho'lrm where Moore transcended 
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its liiuits. Moore misuses this concept in uttering the 
expressions he utters. So no further comments on this 
point will be made here. Furthermore, Wittgenstein offers 
no discussion of the third characteristic by way of cri-
ticism of Moore. 
We will take up the first criterion for calling some-
thing a proof 1 i.e. the premises differ from the conclusion. 
Here we wa.'tt to focus on how the premises "differ" from 
the conclusion. 
Wittgenstein shows that in point of linguistic fact 
they do not ''differ" in this essential aspect; they do not 
differ in the sense needed in the statement of the first 
criterion of a "proof1'. The 0 Here is one hand n and "Here 
is another" do not differ, in an essential way, from the 
conclusion "There is an external world" is seen in the 
.fact that premises are not more certain than the conclusion. 
That Uiere is an external world, i.e., physical ob-
jects, is in normal circumstances, as certain as anything 
that could be produced as evidence for it. This ia why 
one is not in a position, to take the sight of one's hands 
as evidence tor it.(C-2.50) But, it one cannot offer any 
evidence for or against the conclusion, the evidence or 
premises which are offered do not differ from the conclusion, 
in the sense that the premises are said to "support" or 
"justify .. the conclusion. If they do not differ in this 
sense, then they do not "differ" 1n the way needed in the 
characterization of the first criterion. 
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In conclusion, if one cannot say "he knows the pre-
mises to be true", and the premises do not "differ" from 
the conclusion, then one has not offered what is normally 
called a "proof••. Moore has offered a proof where neither 
of the above points obtain. In effect, Moore has offered 
a proof which is no "proof" at all. He has attempted to 
transcend the common criteria of "proof" in attempting to 
offer a uniquely philosophical proof. 
Now for the analysis of Wittgenstein's second objec-
tion. In taking up the doubt as to the existence of the 
external world, there will be a final clarification of 
our analysis of the concept "to doubt" which was t>egun 
in the first chapter of this essay. It will be shown that 
Moore's 0 philosophical proof .. was an attempt to answer a 
nphilosophical doubt". 
Wittgenstein will argue that such a doubt is an ex-
pression of what cannot be expressed in this manner. The 
expression of this sort of doubt will be the utterance of 
factual nonsense. "I doubt the existence of the external 
world" will be a non-significant utterance within this 
context. 
In the second section of chapter one we had distin-
guished three di££erent sorts of doubt. They are: (l) doubts 
that are reasonable, (2) doubts that are superfluous, and 
(J) doubts t.hat are absurd. The nonsensicalness of the 
third sort of doubt was shoi.·m by the fact, t.t'lat speakers 
A, B, and C would not say that this was the doubt o:f a 
reasonable man. But rather they are "irrational ramblings". 
This type of doubt was really not a doubt at all, but evi-
dence for the insanity o.f speaker D. 
!'iow .for an extension of Wi ttgenatein • s analysis or 
this sort of doubt, which is really no doubt at all. Here 
we will want to distinguish this from a "philosophical 
doubt 0 1 and also to distinguish both of these from what we 
could call "ordinary or scientific doubt" or doubting be-
havior. (C-259) 
l'ake l,loore's statement "Here is one hand•1 , and "here 
is another0 • Moore states that he knows these two state-
ments ara t.ru.e. We had observed that the criterion tor 
such a statement is that there is a doubt t;o be removed, a. 
method by which it could be rem.oved. This method is car-
ried out by giving grounds, offering one's position for 
holding, etc. 
How the doubts which are raised and the proof which 
Moore otf ers against them, do not have the criteria of 
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"doubting" described above. Consider the circumstances 
in which Moore would have spoken correctly if he had said, 
•r know that here is a hand." He and his audience, at, the 
British Academy, had his hand in full iriew. Ir his hand 
had bffn concealed in a box it is unlikely that he would 
have pointed at the box and said to his audience "I know 
that there is a hand ... I.£ rumor had it that Moore recently 
lost, his arm and acquired an artif'icia.l one, he would have 
probably used his head as an example. The point is that 
Moore would have wanted the circumstances to be such that 
there was no question or doubt about his hand. ( 0-4S3) 
So it is interMting that Moo:-e of£ers his proof' 
where there is no question or doubt as to the existence 
0£ his hand, and we could also a.aume that there was no 
doubt as to the existence o£ the external world. By way 
ot retort, it could be stated that there was a "philoso-
phical doubt" as to whether his hand existed. This is 
quite true. But Wittgenstein's point now would be that 
one has a "philosophical doubt" 1n circumstances wher• 
there is not any doubt as to the truth of t.he statement 
"I know that is my hand". 
If his hand was in a box or there was the chance that 
' 
Moore had an art1.£icial hand, then this example would not 
be used. Moore and h.is opponent would want to use an 
ex.ample for his *'philosophical doubt" where there was no 
"doubtn as to whether it was his hand or not. The use of 
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an objeot a.s an example for expressing philosophical argu-
ments in support of the questioning or doubt as to the 
existence 0£ that object only works when there is no ordi-
nary doubts like the ones we have cited in our illustration 
of the use of the concept "to doubt." It rnuat be the ca.CJe 
that there is no doubt bef'ore there is a "philosophical 
doubt" as to whether one is certain that that's l'loore's 
hand. 
But it could · ·. be argued that one could be doubting 
the existence of Moore's hand in the sense that the doubter 
may merely be dreaming about Moore and his hand. Indeed 
this is a poweri'u.l argument against certainty in regard 
to objects perceptually given. ':'~1is argument is used by 
Descartes in showing that all perceptual judgments are 
never certain for one may be dreaming. Imagine that we 
were watching D.escartes when he wrote down this argument. 
Suppose t.hat he was facing his fireplaoe, as he developed 
his argument against certainty as regards the existence 
of physical objects. Now we see him get up .from his desk, 
move over to the fireplace and set on new logs. Then he 
sets a tea pot to boil. It would seem a mis-description 
to say that Descartes was in "doubt" as to wheth.er there 
was a fire, or that he was only dreaming. He doesn't 
behave as one would, i.f he was doubting 'the existence 0£ 
the physical world. It would be a misuse of the concept 
"to doubt" to call the above doubting. For Descartes 
displays none o:f the phenomena by which we could say that 
he was doubting. 
Now consider the situation where a man is seated in 
I 
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a room with his back to the .fireplace with a closed screen. 
On different occasions during the day the fire has gone 
out, and so now he s~ops writing to peer over the screen. 
Here would be normal circumstances for saying that. he 
was in "doubt" a.bout whether there was a .fire or not. 
Wittgenstein's point is that where there is a doubt 
about the exist.ence or sa.y a fire, then no nphilosophical 
doubt" would arise. Only if the fire was happily burning 
away could one then pose the philosophical question whether 
there was or wasn't a .fire. 
Consider the following case. A man awakes from a 
nap and observes a fire in his fire place. He is perplexed 
because he hadn't started the fire before he went to bed. 
He shakes his head in order to clear it, stares intently 
at the fire, and says 0 Perhaps I'm dreaming that there is 
.fire.•• With extended. hands .he moves t.owards the fireplace 
t,o feel the heat of the fire. "Y~a, it is hot." He rwi.s 
out of the room and calls his wife. When 'they both return 
to his room, he states "Is this a real firet or am I dream-
ing?" 
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This man is in doubt as to whether he is dreaming or 
awake. His utterence as to doubts about being awake is 
part of his doubt,ing behavior. When a man is having a 
"philosophical doubt" about whether he is dreaming or is 
awake he does not perform these actions. If our philoso-
pher did perform these actions, we would no longer say 
that he had a "philosophical doubt." Behavior which 
would count as criteria tor saying he was in "doubt" as 
to whether he was awake would count against saying that 
he was feeling a "philosophical doubt". 
Let us compare a doubt which Moore attempts to meet 
with philosophical proof and the ordinary sense of the 
concept "doubt" offered above. One of the features of 
the above illustration was that something extraordinary 
had oecured. Another was anxiety over whether that was 
a real fire or just a dream. Now Moore in the British 
Academy was not trying to meet a doubt about the existence 
of the external. world which had these characteristics. 
Indeed Moore would have sent such a questioner off to a 
doctor, rat.her then try to meet his objections himse1f. 
One would not even ca.ll them "objections". Rather they 
are taken to be symptoms, of what is called an "emotional 
problem." 
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So to have a "philosophical doubt" as to whether the 
external world exists does not imply that one is in "doubt0 
as to whether the physical world exists. To call a "philo-
sophical doubt" a 0 doubt0 would be to extend the concept 
beyond the criteria for its application. In such an ex-
tension 2·1oore has uttered factual nonsense. One cannot 
understand the meaning of the concept ••to doubt" for he 
has not offered any new criteria for its use. 
Now for the final set of objections which Wittgenstein 
makes against Moore's proof. The topic has alteattr been 
broached in the explication of Wittgenstein's criticism of 
Moore's use of the concept "to know" in Moore's, "A Defense 
of Common Sense". There it was developed that Moore's 
article had the positive signi.ficance of bringing to light 
a group of propositions which had a similar role in the 
logic of our language. A further clarif'ication of this 
can now be given. 
iJioore thought that in offering a proof for the justi-
fication of the statement 0 There are external objects••, 
that this statement and others like it were empirical pro-
positions. Wittgenstein will show that in point of linguis-
tic fact that 'they are not empirical propositions at all, 
in that Moore attempts to prove this proposition - here 
we are assuming, contrary to fact, that Moore did off er a 
.. proof" to meet "doubts" raised - as one would prove an 
empirical propositions, he is producing nonsense.(C-35) 
I'd t tgenstein writes : 
••• "A is a physical object!' is a piece or 
instruction which we give only to someone 
who doesn't yet understand either what 
"A" means, or what ''physical objects" 
means. Thus it is instruction about the 
use of words, and "physical object" is a 
logical concept. (Like colour, quantity, ••• ) 
And that is why no such proposition as 
"there are physical objects" can be for-
mulated. Yet we encounter such unsuc-
cessful shots at every turn.(c-36) 
Here Witlgenstein begins his criticism with an ana-
lysis of the propositions which Moore attempts to prove. 
Basically, his point is that the assertion "That tree 
is a physical object" (pointing to a tree) is, from an 
analysis o.f its functioning in our language, not an 
assertion about the world. Indeed to call it an assei-
tion would be a mis-description. Rather the utterance 
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or this expression is a verbal indication of the speaker's 
intention to use these concepts in a certain way. It is 
then an expression of the speaker's decision to have the 
concepts function in a particular way, i.e. to mean some-
thing particular by its utterance. 
Wittgenstein's point then is that to assume that the 
proposition "There are P,hysical objects" is asserting 
something about the world is to assume that the truth of 
this proposition can be obtained by showing one's grounds 
or evidence. Assertions can be tested. 
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This is exactly what Moore attempts to do. His proof 
for the existence of the external world consists in off er-
ing his evidence for the truth of this proposition. The 
grounds he presents are his two hands. This is the test 
by which he thought one could demonstrate the truth of the 
proposition. ''There is an external world." 
Imagine the following situation of a child talking 
to its mother. A. "Mother what is that (pointing to a 
radio)?" .a. "That is a Radio.•• A. "What is a radio?" 
B. "Well, a radio is a physical object. Over it we get 
radio waves which ••• " A. naut why is it a physical object? .. 
B. 0 Vell ••• it sits on the table, we can see it, etc." 
A. "But why do you say that it is a physical object just 
because it ••• " a. "Well we just call things like radioes 
physical objects that's all ... A. nsut why.••" .a. "t~ow 
stop it, your asking silly questions." 
Here is a common situation where one utters "A radio 
is a physical object." What is happening here? The mo-
ther explained to her child tJ:1at 'the radio was a physical 
object because it sat on the table, i.e. it doesn't appear 
only to disappear. 
But this is not a test or evidence !or the radio 
being a physical object. Rather, when the child asked 
why do we call such things that sit around, things that 
we can see, etc., physical object, the mother retorts that 
we just call ti.t.11em that. To question why we use this 
expression the way we do is a senseless question to the 
mother. This is just the way we use the expression. 
This is its meaning. The child must accept this, it he 
is to learn his way about. 
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It could be objected that this is a correct descrip-
tion of how we learn the meaning o:f "radio• and "physical 
object". But the meaning of the expression "Radio is a 
physical object" is not necessarily co-extensive with the 
way we wer$ taught to use it. This doesn't seem to refute 
a philosophical use of the expression of the proposition. 
But what would this use be like? 
Surely it's not the following. A. "Well, I just 
don't know. I get these feelings." 3. "What do you feel? .. 
A. "That everything is inside me. It's all inner. There•s 
no outer." B. "I don't quite Wlderstand." A. "Well, I 
know that there is a physical world. But everything looks 
queer and ••• " 
Here we have a situation where "I know that there is 
a physical world" makes sense. 3peak.er A, would not be 
aided by the arguments offered by a realist. Nor would 
we call him an idealist. Rather he has ''emotional pro-
blems". The docrtor wou.ld not show his patient one hand 
and then the other, in an attempt to show him the correct-
ness of the statement. The utterance of that proposition 
is taken as a symptom of a deeper problem to be dealt 
with. It is an expression of a conviction which is 
doubted. We may ask again, what meaning can one give 
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to the uniq·u.ely philosophical use of .,there are physical 
objects". At this point no new criteria has been of.fared. 
In ordinary situations "Object A is a physical object" 
is a piece of instruction on the use of words. .,There 
are physical objects" is an expression of a commitment 
to a certain set of convictions which are doubted. In 
neither case is it part of the criteria for these propo-
sitions to offer grounds or evidence for their truth. 
Wittgenstein has disclosed the meaninglessness of a 
proof for the existance of the external world and doubts 
which call .forth such a proof. It has been shown that 
both Moore and the sceptic have covertly withdrawn the 
ordinary criteria for the use of the concepts "to know", 
"proof", "to doubt••, and "proposition" without replacing 
these criteria with new, extraordinary criteria which could 
offer a new meaning on these concepts in their new contexts. 
The sceptic has generated the illusion o.f disclosing an 
unanswerable question. Moore confirn:ls this illusion with 
an attempted solution to this unanswerable question. 3ut 
all they have in .fact done is to discover a context in 
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which these expressions become strictly meaningless while 
retaining a plausible surf ace appearance of meaningfulness. 
~';e have now completed our examination of .Qn Certain~I 
focusing on Wittgenstei..~'s observation on abnormal occa-
sions for the use of certain pronainent epit.emic concepts. 
Through an explication of his analysis of the "philosophi-
cal use1' of these concepts we have partially sketched the 
limits of factual discourse. 
CHAP'fER. THREE 
THE FUNCTION OF FRAMEWORK PROPOSITIONS IN 
FACTUAL DI3COUR3E 
In chapter two we mentioned what Wittgenstein regarded 
as significant 1n Moore's essay "A Defense of Common Sense". 
i4oore's article was valuable in that it hrought into view 
a set of propositions which played similar roles in the lo-
gic of factual discourse. We also had cause to note that 
Moore attempted to prove a set of propositions which are 
not subject to a proof. This characteristic is contingent 
on the fact that these propositions are not testable. In 
other words, they are not empirical propositions. In 
concluding this essay, chapter three will explicate Wit-
tgenstein's analysis of the status of these propositions. 
In undertaking this task, we will bring together 
Wittgenstein's logical descriptions of the epistemic con-
cepts resultant upon the disclosure of their limits as 
offered in chapter two. To be more precise, Wittgenstein 
develops the thesis that there is a group of role related 
propositions in which the use of the concept "to doubt" 
normally carries no meaning. Furthermore, "to be mis-
taken" is not part of the criteria of these propositions. 
In that the linguistic presupposition of these propositions 
"can •t be" related to ''to doubt" and "to be mistaken", one 
does not normally use the expression "I know that ..... in 
relation to their utterence. These are propositions, 
however, that have "to be certain" as one of their criteria. 
w~at sort of propositions are these? They are 
propositions used 1n the way we have described as being 
"bedrock" or ••framework" propositions. Among these 
sorts of propositions are ones liker "I have lived on 
the earth all my lii'e", "I am called R.M.", and "Object 
A is a physical. object ... 
Before we procede to Wittgenstein•s analysis of 
the above, first a review of his analysis of the concept 
"proposition". It was mentioned that propositions have 
traditionally been divided into two sorts, analytic and 
synthetic. Wittgenstein in his grammatical descriptions 
of the concept •proposition" reveals that this classifi-
cation ia unjustifiable in that it excludes a rule-re-
lated group of propositions. We have called these propo-
sitions :framework or bedrock propositions. As was shown 
these propositions are neither analytic or synthetic. 
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Wittgenstein's analysis disclosed that "Framewort 
propositions" arei (1) "Norms of description, or me'tho-
dological principles tor determining whether som.eching 
exists or not"; (2) "such as to determine of the meaning 
of certain sort of propositionn; (.3) "such as to determin.e 
the meaning of empirical propositions and all utterances 
of this sortl; (4) "a matter of linguistic convention 
rather then necessary and su.ff'icient conditions 11 1 
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(5) ••arbitrary in that they need no justification for being 
what they are"; (6) .. illterna.l.1zed in linguistic practice, 
and persons engaged in this aetivi~y may be quite unable 
to say what they are"; (7) •rough and imprecise"; (9) "Ones 
that fluctuate;" and (10) •such that they are not in conflict 
in the language-game, but can when one language-game con-
fronts another". Here then is a partial description of 
the concept "proposition••. 
His Q.na.lysis also revealed that "empiriea.J. propositionstt 
are: (l) "are utterances that can be tested"; {2) "are 
utterances that can 'be correct or mistaken''; (3) "they 
can be t.rue or false"; (4) ••they have gi"ounds for or 
against them"; and { 5) "They can be just.if ied". This 
completes the description of the concept "proposi'tion" as 
given in .Qn Ceirtaint;y. 
In passing, it should be noted that this analysis has 
not included "mathematical proposit.ions". Wittgenstein 
makes only a few scattered remarks to propositions or this 
sort. Thus, the description of Wittgenstein's analysis or 
t,he concept "proposition" is incomplete. 
No better introduction to that sort of proposition 
which excludes as one of i~s linguistic presuppositions 
the concept "to doubt" can be given then when Wittgenstein 
writes: 
••• Can't an assertoric propositiont which 
is capable of functioning as an hypothesis, 
also be used as a foundation for researeh 
and action? I.E. can't it simply be iso-
lated from doubt, though not according to 
any explicit rule? It simply gets assumed 
as a truism, never called in question, 
perhaps not even formulated..(C-S7) 
Here Wittgenstein draws attention to the fact that 
there are a.ssertoric propositions, i.e., empirical pro-
positions which do not function in language as empirical 
propositions. What particular characteristic of these 
propositions leads him to suspect that they a.re not 
assertions at all? 
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The answer is given in the above. These propositions 
a.re not doubted. As we had seen in the analysis of the 
expression "empirical proposition", it is part of their 
criteria that they a.re t,he sort of utterance that can be 
tested. But "to test" means that there can be someone 
"in doubt" as 'to the truth of 'the statement. To illustrate 
this point two examples will be given. One f'rom the field 
of scientific research and 'the other from non-scientific •• 
discourse. 
Wittgenstein wants to show, by this example and others 
like it, that all inquiry is set so as to exempt certain 
propositions from doubt.' These propositions may not even 
be formulated. The important point is that they lie 
apart from the route traveled by inquiry. (C-,58) The 
first example will be Lavoisier and his chemical investi-
gations. { C-167) 
Lavoisier makes experiments witJl certain substances 
in his laborat,ory. He concludes after long months or 
research that this and that takes place when there is 
burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise 
another time. 
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Now Wittgenstein wants to say that Lavoisier has a' 
definite world-picture, i.e. a system of fra..~ework propo- · 
sitions. He did not invent this. It is not a hypothesis 
that he draws up. Rather he has learned this a.a a child. 
These framework propositions are the matter of course 
foundation for his research and as such go unmentioned. 
Now to make one of them explicit. One of the pre-
suppositions of' these experiemMJ's as t.hat "A substance X 
always reacts to subst.ance Y in the same way, given the 
same circumstances." What role does this presupposition 
play in Lavoisier's scientific researchs? 
Would it not be that this is part of the definition 
0£ what is meant by "substance.•• It is part of the norm 
of description of what is taken to be a ttsubstance." 
Substances are taken to be those sorts of things which 
when you have X and Y reacting under the same circumstances, 
they will react in the same way as they did the week before. 
Within this situation Lavoisier did not formulate, let 
alone doubt, that a substance is that set 0£ phenomena that 
always react. in the same way, under the same circumstances. 
It is something that he would have taken as a truisni. 
What if someone approached him with a doubt as to whether 
this was really a "substance." Lavoisier would have dis-
missed him in rather a cursory way. He might jokingly 
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say nr couldn•t doubt that." This utterance characterizes 
one kind of assertion. If our questioner continued in 
his doubts, Lavoisier might wonder if he was fluent in 
the English language.(C-631) Does he really understand 
the Bnglish language? For everyone knows that substances 
are the sort of phenomena that react in the same way under 
the same circumstances. 
If our questioner continued in his doubts and grew 
more f orce.ful, Lavoisier would not take him as a man who 
doubts in the normal way. Indeed, this is not a "doubt" 
at all. Lavoisier would seek aid, for this man is "Emo-
tionally maladjusted." 
That "substance .. is taken as that particular set of 
phenomena is not something that Lavoisier decided upon. 
Rather it is something that he was taught as a child while 
observing the world around him. It is accepted by all 
those who were brought up in his culture. This is the 
meaning of the concept and the majority of people in his 
culture would not accept doubts about this. Rather it is 
the foundation of all scientific actions.{C-414) 
Now consider the following situation. A man is 
seated in his study reading. liis friend comes walking 
through the door. J...s he does the other asks "shut the 
door." The friend does what was asked. One of the 
presuppositions of this utterance is that door•s are 
the sort of thing that react under a certain amount of 
presure, have a degree of density, etc. It is in other 
words a 0 physical object". 
It is in this situation impossible for either of 
the two men ''to doubt" that the door is a "physical 
object". It one of them would have uttered "Yes, that 
is a physical object" the other might have taken it as 
a joke. It is a truism that they both accept and act 
upon. As with Lavoisier's understanding of the concept 
"substance", it is taken as part of the definition of 
"door0 that it is a physical object. What if' someone. 
a third friend, tried to induce a doubt about whether 
that was a door or not? The situation would be similar 
to the one offered in the first example. 
In both situations doubts were not found acceptable. 
Doubts about whether X and Y are substances or whether a 
door is a physical object are groundless. One can not 
speak about doubts at all. Rat.her that X and Y are sub-
stances and the door is a physical object are grounds for 
subsequent doubts. Whether A is helium or not in the 
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former case, and whether it is wise to shut the door (if 
it was hot out) for the latter. 
'rhat a mistake is logically impossible is the second 
characteristic of this sort of proposition. The grammar 
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of "framework propositions., are such as to exclude "making 
a mistake." For an eJCam.ple, recall 3itua~1on 9 in chapter 
one. There it was shown t}lat propositions like "I am R.M.", 
"I live in Chicago", etc., function in such a way that 
normally they are not mistaken. How was this shown? 
In that situation speaker A refused to accept any 
evidence to the effect that he was not R.M. To give up 
or entertain as mista.}(en bis name, A would have to question 
a set of related propositions likes where he lives, how 
old he is, what he does for a living, etc., and speaker A 
would not allow this. Al1 speaker A's past experience 
spoke in favor of his being R.M. and nothing spoke against 
it. This would concluaivel.Y show that he is in fact R.M. 
That these grounds are conclusive is premised on the 
fact that people are brought up to accept many propositions 
as unmistakeable, and the grounds which one has for them 
are considered conclusive. One does not doubt in normal 
circwnstances tha't one couJ.d .. be mistaken" about these 
things. 
If one was mistaken a.bout where he put his keys this 
is nothing unusual, but what would one say of a person who 
was mista~en about his name? Would one say that he made a 
"mistake" in the same sense as being mistaken about his 
keys? No, one just does not make mistakes about one's 
name. 
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To clarify this, Wittgenstein observes that mistakes 
not only have a. "cause", but they also have a "ground". 
when someone makes a mistake it can in most circumstances 
be fitted into what he knows. If one is "mistaken" about 
where he left his keys, he still knows he is in the right 
house, he ~nows that he has just come home from work, etc. 
Here there is a mistake about one particular point in a 
field of points. 
However, the case of someone who made a "mistake" 
about his identity is different. Joe Jmith said he was 
Jesus Christ and lived in Galilee. He would be mistaken 
about his whole field and not just one or a couple of 
points within it. But this kind of mistake is usually 
called "insanity". One would say that he was "temporarily 
confused and disoriented" and this is not a "mistake". 
In that the concepts "to doubt .. and "to be mistaken" 
are not related to the criteria of "framework proposi-
tion", one could not conceive of their criteria as in-
cluding the concept ••to know". The reasons for this are 
fairly obvious. 
The concept "to know" is used in situations where 
there is a recognition on the part of the speaker that his 
assertion might be subject to dispute. The concept "to 
know" is then used when one is using "empirical proposi-
tions". 
As we had seen, the concept ••to know" means that 
"one can, if requested, offer one's grounds or evidence 
for, one's position for, show the possibility of the 
truth of, and believe that p." "Empirical propositions" 
are propositions that can be 'true or false, can have 
grounds for or against them, and can have evidence for 
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or against them. 'l'he concept .,to know" and 0 emp1rical 
proposition" just hang together in this way. Per Wittgen-
stein, to ask why their grammar hang together in thio way 
is a futile question. They just do. 
With "framework propositions" the case is quite dif-
ferent. As we have shown framework propositions are just 
those propositions which are not "in doubt•• in a particular 
linguistic situation. Lavoisier did not even formulate 
the proposition "A substance always reacts in the same 
way, under the same circumstances". This linguistic pre-
supposition he could not have been "in doubt" about. But 
neither would i't# be grammatically correct to say "I know 
that substances are called things that react ••• " in this 
situation. 
Recall that when Lavoisier was questioned about the 
possibility of whether substance may not mean "something 
that always reacts in the same way, under the same cir-
cumstances", he did not state that he knew such. Rather. 
he dismissed the question. A doubt about the truth of 
this proposition was "groundless" in this situation. 
If "grounds" or "evidence" are lacking one can not 
speak of knowing. It is part of the criteria of "to 
know" that one can off er "grounds" for or against the 
truth of a statement. 
One should not be misled into thinking that one 
could not say "! know that a substance is...... Here 
one may be giving a report on the discovery of a new ma-
terial that did not react as the others had. As an empi-
rical matter, one would have to offer one's grounds, 
evidence, etc., for such a statement. The expression 
.. I know that ••• " is correctly used. 'rhere may be a 
fluctuation between empirical propositions and framework 
propositions. 
That there is a fluctuation is nothing unusual once 
the contextualized character of bedrock propositions is 
understood. A linguistic situation has certain purposes 
and certain presuppositions and bedrock propositions are 
among these presuppositions. These may be explained in 
grammatical propositions. But not all linguistic situa-
tions have the same purposes or presuppositions. So what 
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may be ta.ken as a bedrock proposition in one situation 
could in another be an empirical proposition. 
Though "bedrock propositions" can not be related to 
"to doubt .. or •tto be mistaken" and one incorrectly uses 
the expression "I know that ••• " with them, they are 
"certain". Part of the criteria of "bedrock proposition" 
is certainty behavior. 
To use the example of Lavoisier again, he acted 
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like a man who had not the slightest doubt that "substance" 
means "the sort of thing which reacts in the same way, 
under the same circumstances". One would say of him that 
he was convinced of the meaning of the concept "substance". 
This conviction he shared with his co-workers. If someone 
approached him who did not share this conviction, one would 
expect him to attempt to convince this person. 'rhis attempt 
would be ma.de by giving "reasons" and perhaps through other 
types of "persuasion". 
That the proposition Lavoisier takes as certain is 
certain, is not something he decided. Rat.her, that the 
proposition is certain is dependent on its place in the 
language-game. The most prominent grammatical character-
istic of this sort of proposition is that they can not be 
mistaken. In that "making a mistake" is excluded as a 
linguistic presupposition of this type of proposition, it 
is what Wittgenstein calls "objectively certain". 
To see this, consider the following. One of the 
criterion of "framework propositions" is that they are 
arbitrary. Their arbitrariness is premised on the fact 
that one needs no justification in holding ~~em. If 
there is no need to justify them, then there is no need 
to offer one's grounds, evidence, or position for hol-
ding them. Indeed, there are no grounds or evidence 
for holding them. 3ut, if there are no grounds or 
evidence for them, then there cannot be grounds or evi-
dence which speak against them. Therefore, one cannot 
speak of the possibility of these propositions being 
mistaken within the language-game. 
We have now completed the explication of Wittgen-
stein's analysis of certainty as regards the existence 
of Physical Objects. He has developed the thesis that 
"bedrock propositions" are such that they can.not be 
doubted or mistaken. They are propositions whic~ are 
held as certain. Amongst this sort of proposition a.re 
those which map out the world of physical object.s. 
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